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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most of us love the idea of saving money by purchasing multiple products at 
once. But are better deals always good for competition and consumers? An-
swering this question requires a headlong dive into the puzzle1 of bundling and 
bundled discounts, and the short answer is: “not always.” Bundled discounts 
include “buy one, get one” offers, prix-fixe dinner specials, and rebates for 
meeting multi-product sales targets, to name a few prominent examples. A 
bundled discount occurs “when a seller offers a collection of different goods 
for a lower price than the aggregate price for which it would sell the constitu-
ent products individually.”2 The “defining characteristic” of bundled discounts 
is that “they are multi-product, purchase target discounts—they are condi-
tioned upon purchasing some quantum of goods from multiple product mar-
kets.”3 
This Article considers the legal rules used to determine whether a particular 
instance of bundled discounting is anticompetitive, and it identifies weaknesses 
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 1 See Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for Exclu-
sionary Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 345, 345 (2003) (referring to the “puzzle of 
exclusionary conduct”). 
 2 Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688, 1689 
(2005); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 403 (4th ed. 2008) 
(“[D]iscounts are often attached to a buyer’s purchase of two different things together.”). 
 3 Lambert, supra note 2, at 1694. 
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in a popular approach for evaluating the competitive effects of bundling. A 
recent set of transactions in the telecommunications sector4 is utilized to illus-
trate the shortcomings of a price-cost test for bundled discounts, showing that a 
rule declaring all discounts that result in prices above some unit of incremental 
cost often fails to detect anticompetitive bundling in certain industries.5 This 
discussion will illustrate the conditions under which a bundling practice may 
be anticompetitive, but nonetheless legal under the “discount attribution 
test”—a test that provides a rule of per se legality for “above cost”6 bundled 
discounts—adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cascade Health 
Solutions v. PeaceHealth.7 The conclusions drawn in this article, together with 
the fact that industries prone to such errors are prevalent, indicates that the the-
ory underlying the Ninth Circuit’s test is flawed. 
Bundled discounts that raise anticompetitive concerns traditionally involve 
the grouping of one or more products over which an incumbent firm has sub-
stantial market power (the “bundling” product) along with a product that faces 
more robust competition (the “competitive” product).8 As this Article will 
demonstrate, it is rather easy for firms to employ bundled discounts anti-
competitively, where two conditions are present: the package’s bundling prod-
ucts are insulated with high barriers to entry and the bundled products experi-
ence extremely low marginal costs.9 Consequently, where these conditions are 
present, incumbent firms may successfully deter entry through two primary 
means: First, they may take advantage of high barriers to entry in the bundling 
product markets to erect multi-tiered entry barriers, making it harder for com-
                                                
 4 See infra Part I. 
 5 The case study I examine has been the subject of a Department of Justice Antitrust 
Division enforcement action that ended in a consent decree. See infra, note 47 and accom-
panying text. 
 6 See discussion infra note 17 (providing a fuller explanation of “above-cost” dis-
counts). 
 7 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 8 Many—indeed probably most—bundled discounts do not raise competitive concerns, 
and are simply groups of products offered at a package price that is discounted off of the 
price of the products purchased separately. See, e.g., Lambert, supra note 2, at 1689-92. 
 9 Although I refer to “marginal costs” at various points in this Article, the Cascade test 
uses average variable cost to determine whether or not a discount is “below cost.” Cascade 
Health Solution, 502 F.3d at 910. The conclusions drawn here are not affected by which 
measure of cost is used, as marginal cost and average variable cost are similar in the indus-
tries discussed. The operative intuition for the purposes of this Article is that in certain in-
dustries, wireless mobile services being the example used here, the increase in cost that is 
incurred from serving an additional customer is negligible for an efficient wireless network.  
Average variable cost is often used to approximate marginal cost, since marginal cost is 
difficult to measure. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related 
Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 716 (1975); see gen-
erally Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d 895. 
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petitors to contest the individual competitive product market.10 The difficulty 
arises because new entrants must invest in entering multiple markets at once to 
make a comparable package offer to consumers.11 Second, incumbents may use 
limit-pricing strategies by effectively dropping the price on the competitive 
product down to marginal cost—which is often near zero in many industries—
to undermine new entry by signaling the unprofitability of entering the com-
petitive product market.12 This limit-pricing strategy is especially effective 
where there are substantial barriers to entry into the competitive product mar-
ket itself, since structural disincentives to enter already exist.13 Moreover, it is 
possible for incumbents to achieve this sort of exclusion without offending the 
Cascade rule of per se legality for above-cost discounts, since below-cost (i.e., 
“predatory”) pricing is unnecessary to deter entry in these particular ways. 
A typical bundling case is brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,14 
and alleges the foreclosure of a dominant firm’s horizontal rival from some 
market, customer, or opportunity.15 The theory underlying a typical bundling 
case16 is that the firm is excluded because it is less diversified in what it pro-
duces and cannot offer a comparable bundle consisting of all products sold by 
the dominant bundling firm.17 Importantly, under this theory, anticompetitive 
                                                
 10 See Lambert, supra note 2, at 1694. 
 11 See id. 
 12 See generally Aaron R. Moore, Anticompetitive Bundled Discounts: A Way Out of the 
Wilderness, 37 J. CORP. L. 951 (2012); Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d 895. 
 13 See Lambert, supra note 2, at 1694. 
 14 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). This discussion does not delve the specific requirements for 
making out a claim of monopolization or attempted monopolization in court. Instead, it is 
concerned with describing bundling as a predicate act for a monopolization-related offense. 
For such a discussion, see Spectrum Sport v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993) (outlin-
ing the specific requirements for making out a claim of monopolization or attempted mo-
nopolization); see also Moore, supra note 12, at 958. 
 15 Moore, supra note 12, at 954 (“There is not yet a Supreme Court ruling concerning 
bundled discounts, and the circuit courts are in disagreement about which bundled discounts 
are anticompetitive. Bundled discounts sit in a unique legal middle ground between preda-
tory pricing and product tying, demonstrating some elements of each.”) 
 16 Scholars disagree over whether bundling of this sort can even be anticompetitive; still 
others believe it can be anticompetitive but should never be illegal. Professor Herbert Ho-
venkamp sums up the theory underlying anticompetitive bundling in the following way: 
“Bundled discounts might be thought to threaten competition when the dominant firm 
makes several goods while rivals make only one good or perhaps some subset of the domi-
nant firm’s offering.” HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 404. See also Barry Nalebuff, Bundling 
As a Way to Leverage Monopoly (Yale Sch. of Mgmt. Working Paper Series ES, Paper No. 
36, Oct. 8, 2004), available at http://commcns.org/1dYGM5v (arguing that “in the general 
case, a monopolist can earn higher profits by leveraging its power into a competitive mar-
ket.”). The late Judge Robert Bork provides a viewpoint critical to this theory of exclusion-
ary bundling, as well as one of the most famous criticisms of the theory. See ROBERT A. 
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 372–75 (1978) (proposing an alternative viewpoint regard-
ing leveraging power in a competitive marketplace). 
 17 See Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 
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exclusion is still possible even if the marginalized firm can provide the product 
as efficiently as the bundler. Similarly, the theory holds that exclusion is still a 
possibility if the incumbent firm’s pricing is above cost and, therefore, not 
“predatory.”18 One of the central difficulties with evaluating bundled discounts 
then, is to decide how to treat non-predatory bundles that may still be anticom-
petitive. Courts have endeavored to fashion methodologies that can appropri-
ately separate pro-competitive bundles from anticompetitive ones, and there 
currently exists a split among the circuits in how to treat bundled discounts 
under the antitrust laws.19 
The two dominant schools of thought in antitrust bundling analyses revolve 
around the Third Circuit’s decision in LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M 20 and the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth. 21  In the 
LePage’s case, the court condemned a self-admitted monopolist’s bundled re-
bate program based on traditional Section 2 principles, without requiring a 
showing of below-cost pricing.22 It distinguished bundling from predatory pric-
ing, for which there is a rule of per se legality for above-cost discounts.23 The 
                                                                                                             
EMORY L.J. 424, 425 (2006) (“Mixed bundling strategies may be employed by a dominant 
firm to foreclose competition by a single-product competitor that is unable to match the 
multiproduct or multimarket discounts and therefore loses sales in the sole market in which 
it competes with the dominant firm.”). 
 18 An oft-cited example is Judge Kaplan’s hypothetical involving the sale of shampoo 
and conditioner: 
Assume for the sake of simplicity that the case involved the sale of two hair products, 
shampoo and conditioner, the latter made only by A and the former by both A and B. 
Assume as well that both must be used to wash one’s hair. Assume further that A’s av-
erage variable cost for conditioner is $2.50, that its average variable cost for shampoo 
is $1.50, and that B’s average variable cost for shampoo is $1.25. B therefore is the 
more efficient producer of shampoo. Finally, assume that A prices conditioner and 
shampoo at $5 and $3, respectively, if bought separately but at $3 and $2.25 if bought 
as part of a package. Absent the package pricing, A’s price for both products is $8. B 
therefore must price its shampoo at or below $3 in order to compete effectively with A, 
given that the customer will be paying A $5 for conditioner irrespective of which 
shampoo supplier it chooses. With the package pricing, the customer can purchase both 
products from A for $5.25, a price above the sum of A’s average variable cost for both 
products. In order for B to compete, however, it must persuade the customer to buy B’s 
shampoo while purchasing its conditioner from A for $5. In order to do that, B cannot 
charge more than $0.25 for shampoo, as the customer otherwise will find A’s package 
cheaper than buying conditioner from A and shampoo from B. On these assumptions, 
A would force B out of the shampoo market, notwithstanding that B is the more effi-
cient producer of shampoo, without pricing either of A’s products below average vari-
able cost. 
Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 19 Lambert, supra note 2, at 1699-1700 (outlining five possible approaches courts could 
take in evaluating bundled discounts). 
 20 See generally LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 21 See generally Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 22 LePage’s, Inc., 324 F.3d at 144. 
 23 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 209-11 
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court held that this rule (i.e., above-cost discounting is always legal) did not 
apply in non-oligopolistic markets.24 It ultimately found the monopolist’s bun-
dling program to be exclusionary under Section 2. 25  Under 
the LePage’s decision, bundling may be deemed unlawful exclusionary con-
duct under the general rule in Aspen Skiing,26 where the U.S. Supreme Court 
defined anticompetitive conduct as “behavior that impairs the opportunities of 
rivals through conduct that either does not constitute competition on the merits 
or achieves a competitive benefit in an unnecessarily restrictive way.”27 
In the second major bundling case, Cascade, the court adopted a “discount 
attribution” cost-based test containing an above-cost safe harbor.28 Under that 
test, the full amount of discounts given by the defendant on the bundle is allo-
cated to the competitive product.29 The bundle will not be declared illegal un-
der Section 2 unless the resulting price of the competitive product is below the 
firm’s average variable cost to produce it.30 The Cascade court adapted the rule 
of per se legality for above-cost discounts from predatory pricing doctrine to 
the bundling scenario.31 It expressed concern that an erroneous finding of anti-
trust liability (i.e., a type I error or “false positive”), and concomitant treble 
damages award, would be too likely to occur under the framework of the 
LePage’s decision.32 That prospect, according to the LePage’s court, would 
chill price-cutting and ultimately lead to higher prices for consumers.33 These 
concerns prompted the court to adopt a bright-line, price-cost rule that pro-
vided a standard of legality based on a company’s own cost information.34 
                                                                                                             
(1993) (holding that any simple price cut in the single-product context, resulting in a price 
exceeding the seller’s cost, is immune from antitrust liability). 
 24 LePage’s, Inc., 324 F.3d at 168–69. 
 25 The court upheld jury findings imposing liability on the defendant under section 2 of 
the Sherman Act. LePage’s, Inc., 324 F. 3d at 155–57 (explaining that the principal an-
ticompetitive effect of bundled rebates as offered by 3M is that “when offered by a monopo-
list, they may foreclose portions of the market to a potential competitor who does not manu-
facture an equally diverse group of products and who therefore cannot make a comparable 
offer.”). It concluded that, “3M used its monopoly in transparent tape, backed by its consid-
erable catalog of products, to squeeze out LePage’s.” Id. at 157 (In effect, customers who 
wanted to reap the full rebate amount offered by 3M had to purchase products in numerous 
categories, while LePage’s only competed in the transparent tape market.”). 
 26 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
 27 See Jonathan Rubin, Bundling as Exclusionary Pricing to Maintain Monopoly, COM-
PETITION POL’Y INT’L 5 (June 2008). 
 28 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. The court ultimately adopted average variable cost as the appropriate measure-
ment of incremental cost, and vacated the district court’s finding of liability on the bun-
dling-related monopolization claim. Id. at 917. 
 31 Id. at 905. 
 32 Id. at 908. 
 33 LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 159 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 34 Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 907. 
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Using the above-mentioned telecommunications agreements as a lens, this 
Article contends that the discount attribution test adopted by the Ninth Circuit 
is unacceptably prone to producing false negatives.35 This result is likely be-
cause the test requires a showing of below-cost pricing on the product facing 
competition.36 But in product markets in which average variable costs of pro-
duction are close to zero, as they are in the mobile wireless market (the “bun-
dled” product in the LePage’s case),37 an anticompetitive bundling strategy is 
essentially immune from liability in all but the most extreme cases involving 
the deepest of discounts. This is an important and, as this Article will argue, 
probably unintended consequence of this rule of law— if a firm does not price 
below cost on its bundle, it does not necessarily follow that the bundle is pro-
competitive or competition-neutral.38 Even accepting that antitrust law should 
prefer false negatives to false positives,39 there is strong reason to believe that 
industries prone to false negatives are more common than the court in Cascade 
could have imagined.40 The main intuition here is that the broad space for dis-
counting—as a result of extremely low costs of production in telecommunica-
                                                
 35 A “false negative,” or “Type II error,” is an underinclusiveness error, and refers to an 
instance of anticompetitive conduct going undetected. In the context of antitrust law, this 
would be a judicial finding that no antitrust violation occurred, when in fact the defendant’s 
conduct is actually anticompetitive. On the other hand, a false positive, or “Type I error,” is 
an over-inclusiveness error. In antitrust, this would be represented by a judicial finding that 
a defendant committed an antitrust violation, when the conduct was not actually anticom-
petitive. See Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 711 (1996) (defining and discussing these terms in 
the context of securities law). 
 36 Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 898. 
 37 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, 3M v. LePage’s Inc., 542 U.S. 953 
(2004) (No. 02-1865). 
 38 Professor Aaron Edlin has proposed using “consumer betterment” in place of a price-
cost test for determining whether low-prices in the single-product scenario are anticompeti-
tive. AARON EDLIN, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 39 (Einer 
El Hauge ed., 2013). Instead of asking whether a challenged practice is likely to exclude an 
equally or more efficient competitor from the defendant’s market, Edlin would ask whether 
“the challenged practice is likely . . . to exclude . . . a competitor who would provide con-
sumers a better deal than they would get from the monopoly.” Id. 
 39 See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 86 
(2010). Devlin and Jacobs present the accepted wisdom: “[m]ore than any other area of civil 
law, antitrust is error-prone.” Id. As they explain, faced with such uncertainty in application 
of the law, antitrust has adopted a decision-theoretic standard that prefers underenforcement 
to overenforcement. Id. As a result, “this principle has significantly influenced the substan-
tive and procedural barriers to recovery created by the courts” and that “[d]octrine has been 
deliberately crafted to siphon off complaints that bear an unacceptable propensity for false 
positives.” Id. This inclination to err on the side of underenforcement has “aligned the U.S. 
judiciary in large degree with the conservative teachings of the Chicago School.” Id. at 84. 
See also Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L. REV. 
871 (2011) (arguing that the antitrust decisions of the Roberts Court are consistent with the 
Chicago School preference for false negatives over false positives). 
 40 Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 908. 
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tions and other industries—raises the prospect that firms may use bundling to 
deter entry into certain markets by firms that would become as efficient as the 
existing firms. These observations, in turn, could be applied to future instances 
of bundled discounting in markets that share structural similarities with those 
discussed here.41 Indeed, the discussion will contend that such effects are likely 
to occur in a non-trivial number of cases, making the concern with under-
inclusion more practical than theoretical, and calling into question the deci-
sion-theoretical underpinnings of the rule adopted in Cascade. Therefore, it is 
my position that if a legal rule or formulation can be fashioned that does not 
also tend to affirmatively protect inefficiencies, then the discount attribution 
test is not a panacea for addressing the competitive harms that may stem from 
a bundled discount program. 
The test’s operative mechanism—a cost-based standard42— leads to an un-
derinclusive approach to liability that may yield many more false negatives 
than the Ninth Circuit probably contemplated. Because the Cascade price-cost 
test43 does not contain a mechanism for addressing the competitive effects of 
bundled discounts short of excluding an existing and equally efficient competi-
tor, there is good reason to seek out an alternate approach. The work of this 
Article, however, is not to propose an alternative to the discount attribution 
test.44 Instead, the goal here is to demonstrate that any adherence to it must ac-
cept that it is best understood as an underinclusive rule of prophylaxis, and not 
a final solution to the bundling and bundled discounts puzzle. Moreover, the 
                                                
 41 Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 
815 (2002). 
 42 Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 905. 
 43 See supra note 36. 
 44 Alternative doctrinal solutions have been suggested, although I do not evaluate them 
here. Professor Thomas Lambert, for example, has proposed a “third way” alternative to 
LePage’s and Cascade. Under Lambert’s approach, an above-cost bundled discount is pre-
sumed legal, but the plaintiff would still have the opportunity to prove “certain easily ascer-
tainable facts indicating genuine exclusion of an efficient rival.” Lambert, supra note 39. 
This proposed test would require the following showings: there are barriers to entry in the 
product market in which the plaintiff does not compete as well as the competitive product 
market; the plaintiff cannot practically coordinate with other producers to produce a compet-
ing bundle; and the plaintiff made a good faith effort to become a supplier to the discounter 
but was rebuffed. See Lambert, supra note 2, at 1742. While Lambert’s approach recognizes 
that above-cost bundled discounts can be exclusionary, it would not look beyond exclusion 
of existing rivals.  In his work in the area of single-product predatory pricing, Professor 
Edlin, on the other hand, has proposed incorporating a sensitivity to the opportunities of new 
and potential entrants who are not yet efficient. See Aaron Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost 
Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941, 945 (2002). Edlin’s test for exclusionary single-
product pricing proposes that, in markets where incumbents “enjoy significant advantages 
over potential entrants, but another firm enters and provides buyers with a substantial dis-
count, the monopoly should be prevented from responding with substantial price cuts or 
significant product advancements until the entrant has had a reasonable time to recover its 
entry costs and become viable.” Id. 
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weakness of the price-cost model45 suggests that jurisdictions implementing 
new liability rules for bundled discounts should consider the creation of an 
alternate model. 
This Article will point out the ways in which the telecommunications bundle 
could be used anti-competitively,46 while still passing muster under the test. In 
Part I, I describe the new product bundle that forms the basis of the case study 
I rely upon to draw my conclusions, and in Part II, I outline the contours of the 
two dominant approaches to addressing the legality of the bundled discounts 
under the antitrust laws. In Part III, I describe the theory behind the notion that 
low prices can also be anticompetitive prices.  In Part IV, I demonstrate how 
the Cascade test could produce a false negative. Finally, in Part V, I argue that 
false negatives are actually much more prevalent than proponents of that rule 
might expect, concluding that the Cascade test relies upon a decision-theoretic 
framework that is ill-suited to evaluating bundled discounts in several critical 
sectors of our economy. 
II. THE QUAD PLAY BUNDLE 
In December 2011, Verizon Wireless and several cable companies (the “Ca-
ble Defendants”)47 entered into a series of commercial agreements (the “Com-
mercial Agreements”) that would allow them to market “quad play” bundles 
for retail sale.48  These four-part packages consist of residential voice, video 
and broadband services, along with wireless mobile telephone service.49 Resi-
dential voice, video and broadband services are commonly offered and pur-
chased in bundles known as “triple plays.”50  Companies that provide each 
component service themselves typically offer these three-part bundles.51 But 
when a company cannot supply each service, it may partner with complemen-
                                                
 45 See Lambert, supra note 2, at 1690; Edlin, supra note 44, at 955. 
 46 Professor Daniel Rubinfeld has written that in the bundling context, “[a]s a general 
rule, one might view bundled rebates as anticompetitive if they (a) reduce consumers wel-
fare, and (b) do so by impairing rivals’ ability to make competitive offers to potential cus-
tomers.” Daniel Rubinfeld, 3M’s Bundled Rebates: An Economic Perspective, 72 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 243, 251 (2005). 
 47 The Cable Defendants are Comcast, Time Warner, Cox, and Bright House Networks.  
Complaint at 1, United States v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 12-CV-01354 (D.D.C. Aug. 
16, 2012), 2012 WL 3528463. 
 48 Id. at 2. 
 49 News Release: Verizon’s New ‘Quad-Play’ Bundle Offers Customers Wireless Call-
ing With Home Phone, TV and Broadband in Money-Saving Combinations, VERIZON (Oct. 
19, 2009), http://commcns.org/1f9M9Pp. 
 50 Complaint, supra note 47, at 6. 
 51 Competitive Impact Statement at 6, United States v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 
12-CV-01354 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2012), 2012 WL 3868038. 
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tary providers to offer bundles.52 
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, Verizon perceives opportuni-
ties for growth in the development of integrated wireline-wireless services, but 
only offers FiOS, its brand of wireline services, in a portion of the country.53 
The Cable Defendants, on the other hand, each have a large customer base and 
a broad geographic footprint, and are thus attractive partners for providing 
complementary component services to Verizon Wireless in its attempt to offer 
a four-part bundle.54 The sale of a quad play bundle, however, raises the pros-
pect of harm to competition,55 since several of the Cable Defendants possess 
monopoly power in certain geographic markets in the United States.56 This dis-
cussion focuses on the particular risk of harm to competition in the wireless 
market and will refer to that market as the “competitive” market because the 
discount attribution tests speaks in terms of a “competitive” product market 
and focuses on the “product facing competition”;57 however, there is substan-
tial debate as to whether the wireless market is actually “competitive” in the 
traditional sense of the word.58 
                                                
 52 Id. 
 53 Final Judgment at 5, United States v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 12-CV-01354 
(D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2013). 
 54 There surely are a host of other competition issues raised by these agreements. For 
example, the Cable Defendants and Verizon Wireless are competitors in some markets, and 
may become competitors in the wireless service market; however, these issues are beyond 
the scope of this discussion. Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 51. 
 55 Moore, supra note 12, at 954. Although the quad play would be offered by multiple 
firms as a cross-seller bundle, analysis of its competitive effects could probably take place 
under either section 1 or 2, the latter route would potentially be appropriate given that the 
package would contain one or more monopoly products. Courts will almost certainly ana-
lyze a bundling challenge the same way, regardless of the section of the Sherman Act under 
which the plaintiff brings the suit. 
 56 The arguments in this Article proceed on the uncontroversial assumption that some 
Cable Defendants possess monopoly power, or at least substantial market power, in some 
local markets over voice, video, or broadband. In re Annual Assessment of the Status of 
Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Fourteenth Report, 27 
F.C.C.R. 8610, 8627 (July 20, 2012); see also SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE 
TELECOM INDUSTRY & MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 9 (2013) (describing the 
existence of monopoly power in numerous geographic areas over numerous services in the 
telecommunications industry). The Department of Justice also views the relevant markets 
and market power this way, though it did not pursue monopolization claims in its suit to 
enjoin the deals. See Complaint, supra note 47, at 11 (“The Cable Defendants are dominant 
in many local markets for both video and broadband services.”). The Antitrust Division sued 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, pursuing litigation based on nationwide market share 
figures. Id. This approach was surely a more efficient way for the government to remedy the 
antitrust concerns stemming from the deals and, in fact, the DOJ did not pursue the theory 
proposed in this Article. Nonetheless, this choice of litigation strategy says little about the 
viability of the theory of competitive harm via bundling analyzed here. 
 57 See infra note 61. 
 58 Compare Second Amended Complaint, United States v. AT&T, Inc., No. 11-CV-
01560 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2011) (describing high levels concentration in mobile wireless and 
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Bundling in competitive markets, of course, ordinarily raises no concern for 
antitrust.59 Indeed, there are many pro-competitive or competitive-neutral ex-
planations for why mixed bundling occurs.60 However, mixed bundling may 
also be used by dominant firms to protect or maintain a monopoly, or to extend 
monopoly power into competitive markets.61 Consequently, there are several 
ways in which bundling can be harmful to competition.62 The antitrust concerns 
raised by the Commercial Agreements, as well as the circuit split described in 
this Article, provide a good opportunity to re-examine contemporary bundling 
analysis under the antitrust laws, as there are several reasons to conclude that 
the four-part bundle to be sold by Verizon Wireless, in partnership with the 
Cable Defendants, can be used to the detriment of competition in the wireless 
service market.63 The remainder of this Article describes two dominant ap-
proaches to evaluating bundled discounts and observes several difficulties with 
the Ninth Circuit’s rule (despite it being the more popular approach) by identi-
fying some of the ways that the test may yield false negatives, or instances of 
anticompetitive conduct going undetected.64 In addition to having been adopted 
by the Ninth Circuit, the discount attribution test has been employed in two 
district court cases in the Second Circuit and was recommended by the biparti-
san Antitrust Modernization Commission.65  Additionally, a group of antitrust 
                                                                                                             
arguing that the four large providers, who provided more than 90% of service connections 
nationwide, were “well-positioned to drive competition at both a national and local level”), 
with Gerald R. Faulhaber et al., Assessing Competition in U.S. Wireless Markets: Review of 
the FCC’s Competition Reports, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 319, 328–29 (2012) (arguing that indi-
rect evidence of market power derived from market definition analysis is an antiquated ap-
proach, and that the wireless industry is actually “effectively competitive”). 
 59 Bruce H. Kobayashi, Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to Regulating Com-
modity Bundling by Firms? A Survey of the Economic Literature, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 707, 708 (2005). 
 60 Professor Daniel Crane has catalogued some of the most significant procompetitive 
and competitively-neutral reasons that firms engage in mixed bundling. He explains that 
bundling may yield cost efficiencies, including economies of scope and transactions costs 
savings, and that bundling can be a form of procompetitive price discrimination. Crane, 
supra note 17, at 431-32. 
 61 Again, this view is not uncontroversial. See id. at 427 n.11. 
 62 Id. at 443 (explaining that the two main theories of anticompetitive bundling are forc-
ing rival firms to price unprofitably and creating entry barriers by raising rivals’ costs). 
 63 For the sake of illustration, this discussion focuses on the agreements as they stood 
before the Department of Justice sued to enjoin the transactions, winning fundamental con-
cessions reflected in a Proposed Final Judgment filed with the D.C. District Court. See 
Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 51, at 3–4. It therefore focuses on the bundling-
related harms that would have resulted had the government not intervened. The court has 
approved the settlement; therefore, it will operate as a consent decree. See Final Judgment, 
United States v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 12-CV-01354 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2013). 
 64 See supra note 35. 
 65 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT & RECOMMENDATION 99 (Apr. 
2007). The recommendation stated, inter alia, that courts should require a plaintiff to show 
that “after allocating all discounts and rebates attributable to the entire bundle of products to 
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law professors urged its adoption as amici curiae in Cascade itself.66 
III. EVALUATING BUNDLED DISCOUNTS: A SPLIT AMONG 
THE CIRCUITS 
This section summarizes the Third Circuit’s approach to evaluating bundled 
discounts, articulated in LePage’s v. 3M,67 as well as the Ninth Circuit ap-
proach from Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth.68 
 
A. The Third Circuit Exclusionary Conduct Approach 
 
In this case, LePage’s, a manufacturer of private label transparent tape, al-
leged that 3M maintained a monopoly in the market for transparent tape by, 
among other things, a bundled rebate program for large retail stores.69 The dis-
counts were conditioned on purchasers meeting sales targets in six diverse 
categories including health care, home care, home improvement, stationery 
(including transparent tape), retail auto and “leisure time.”70 The number of 
product categories in which the purchaser met 3M’s stated target determined 
the size of the discount.71 The court noted that “[i]f a customer failed to meet 
the target for any one product, its failure would cause it to lose the rebate 
across the line. This created a substantial incentive for each customer to meet 
the targets across all product lines to maximize its rebates.”72 In effect, custom-
ers who wanted to reap the full rebate amount offered by 3M had to purchase 
products in numerous categories. However LePage’s only competed in the 
transparent tape market and lost sales when several retail chains shifted their 
tape purchases to 3M.73 LePage’s alleged that to defeat this shift, it would have 
to compensate purchasers for the loss of rebates across all of those product 
lines, and not just the loss of tape-specific rebates, which it could not do based 
                                                                                                             
the competitive product, the defendant sold the competitive product below its incremental 
cost for the competitive product.” 
 66 See Brief for Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Defendant-Appellant and 
Cross-Appellee PeaceHealth Supporting Reversal of the Verdict Concerning Bundled Dis-
counts at 2, Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (2007) (No. 05-35627).  
Professors Crane, Lambert, Morgan, Sokol and Squire argued that “bundled discounts 
should never be unlawful unless, at a minimum, the seller has charged a below-cost price in 
the competitive market after discounts given in the non-competitive market are reallocated 
to the competitive market.” Id.  
 67 LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 68 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 893 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 69 LePage’s, Inc., 324 F. 3d at 145. 
 70 Id. at 154. 
 71 Id. at 145. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
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on its limited product line.74 
In declining to analogize bundling to predatory pricing,75 the court observed 
that bundled rebates might be anticompetitive when offered by a monopolist.76 
The court reasoned that the principal anticompetitive effect of bundled rebates 
occurs “when offered by a monopolist, [bundled discounts] may foreclose por-
tions of the market to a potential competitor who does not manufacture an 
equally diverse group of products and who therefore cannot make a compara-
ble offer.”77 The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, ultimately affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment in favor of LePage’s.78 The court concluded, “the jury could 
reasonably find that 3M used its monopoly in transparent tape, backed by its 
considerable catalog of products, to squeeze out LePage’s.”79 The court relied 
on more familiar principles of Section 2 exclusionary conduct, eschewing a 
cost-based test.80 It did not require LePage’s to show that it, or a hypothetically 
equally efficient (as 3M) competitor could not meet the discounts without pric-
ing below cost.81 
 
B. The Ninth Circuit Cost-Based Rule 
 
In Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth,82 PeaceHealth and Cascade’s 
predecessor, McKenzie, was a competitor in the markets for primary and sec-
ondary acute-care hospital services. 83  PeaceHealth also provided “tertiary 
care,” which includes more complex services like invasive cardiovascular sur-
gery, with over a 90% market share in certain sub-specialties.84 McKenzie did 
not provide tertiary care services.85 PeaceHealth began to offer bundled service 
packages to some insurance companies, including large discounts on tertiary 
services, if the insurer made PeaceHealth its sole preferred provider of all serv-
ices—primary, secondary and tertiary.86 McKenzie sued under Section 2, alleg-
ing that PeaceHealth engaged in anticompetitive conduct by offering these 
bundled discounts to the insurance companies. McKenzie argued that Peace-
                                                
 74 Id. at 174. 
 75 Id. at 155. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 141. 
 79 Id. at 157. 
 80 Id. at 152-54. 
 81 See Gary P. Zanfagna, LePage’s v. 3M: A Reality Check, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Nov. 
2004), available at http://commcns.org/KMkzMo. 
 82 See generally Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 83 Id. at 892–93. 
 84 Id. at 891. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 892. 
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Health had “coerced” insurers into purchasing primary and secondary services 
from PeaceHealth based on its monopoly power in tertiary care.87 
The Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case so that the 
trial court could instruct the jury on a new cost-based rule announced by the 
court: 
To prove that a bundled discount was exclusionary or predatory for the purposes of a 
monopolization or attempted monopolization claim under  
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must establish that, after allocating the discount 
given by the defendant on the entire bundle of products to the competitive product or 
products, the defendant sold the competitive product or products below its average 
variable cost of producing them.88 
 The court held that the “exclusionary conduct element of a claim arising 
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act cannot be satisfied by reference to bundled 
discounts unless the discounts result in prices that are below an appropriate 
measure of the defendant’s costs.”89 It adopted a “discount attribution” stan-
dard under which the “full amount of the discounts given by the defendant on 
the bundle are allocated to the competitive product or products.”90 Under this 
standard, if the “resulting price of the competitive product . . . is below the de-
fendant’s incremental cost to produce them, the trier of fact may infer the bun-
dle is exclusionary,” for the purposes of Section 2.91 According to the court, 
this standard would only condemn those bundles that have the potential to ex-
clude a “hypothetical equally efficient producer of the competitive product.”92 
The Ninth Circuit, in adopting this rule with an above-cost safe harbor, re-
called that the Supreme Court had “forcefully suggested” that prices above 
some measure of incremental cost should not be condemned under the antitrust 
laws.93 This view stemmed from a fear of chilling legitimate price-cutting.94 
The court therefore extended the predatory pricing rule announced in the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Brooke Group Ltd v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
                                                
 87 Id. at 893. 
 88 Id. at 910. 
 89 Id. at 903. 
 90 Id. at 906. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. It should also be noted that the requirement of below-cost pricing is best under-
stood as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for finding a bundle to be exclusionary 
under this test; if a firm’s bundle “fails” the test, it is presumably still given an opportunity 
to offer an efficiency justification. Professor Lambert, for example advocates for certain 
additional showings. These would include a requirement that the complaining rival show 
first that barriers to entry in other product markets prevented it from expanding its scope to 
offer a competing bundle, and that it could not have collaborated with sellers of products 
within those other product markets to offer a competitive cross-seller bundle. See Lambert, 
supra note 2, at 1745. 
 93 Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 901. 
 94 Id. 
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Corp.,95 an opinion that has been highly resonant in judicial and scholarly at-
tempts to arrive at a satisfactory bundling analysis.96 The Ninth Circuit felt 
bound to the rule that “a plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury result-
ing from a rival’s low prices must prove that the prices complained of are be-
low an appropriate measure of its rival’s costs.”97 It continued, recalling that 
“the Court [in Brooke Group] went on to emphasize that ‘[l]ow prices benefit 
consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they are above 
predatory levels, they do not threaten competition.’”98 It once again noted that 
the Court in Brooke Group stated a general rule: “the exclusionary effect of 
prices above a relevant measure of cost either reflects the lower cost structure 
of the alleged predator, and so represents competition on the merits, or is be-
yond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control without courting in-
tolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-cutting.”99 Thus, it is clear that the 
Ninth Circuit resolved to adopt a bundling analysis modeled after the Supreme 
Court’s predatory pricing doctrine. It was influenced by the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning that low prices are the essence of competition on the merits, and that 
a more nuanced rule would threaten to chill this usually precompetitive con-
duct.100 
IV. LOW-PRICING AND ANTICOMPETITIVE HARM 
At the outset, it is crucial to keep in mind that low pricing is the very con-
duct that antitrust aims to promote.101 Many commentators—perhaps most fa-
                                                
 95 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 209-11 
(1993). 
 96 The Ninth Circuit also cited the work of the Antitrust Modernization Commission, 
which reasoned that its proposed test would “as a whole, bring the law on bundled discount-
ing in line with the Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke Group.” Cascade Health Solutions, 
515 F.3d at 900 (internal citations omitted). 
 97 Id. at 901 (quoting Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 
U.S. 209, 222 (1993)). 
 98 Id. at 901. 
 99 Id. 
 100 The Ninth Circuit Court elaborated: 
In Weyerhaeuser, Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, reminded us that, in 
Brooke Group, the Court had cautioned that “the costs of erroneous findings of 
predatory-pricing liability were quite high because [t]he mechanism by which a 
firm engages in predatory pricing—lowering prices—is the same mechanism by 
which a firm stimulates competition, and therefore, mistaken findings of liability 
would chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.” 
Id. at 903 (alteration in original) (quoting Weyerhauser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood 
Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S. 312, 320 (2007)). 
 101 Harm to competition may result even where a dominant firm’s course of conduct 
initially involves price-cutting. Upon taking the helm as Assistant Attorney General for 
Antitrust, Christine reminded the antitrust community of this in withdrawing the “Section 2 
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mously, Robert Bork102—have forcefully argued that harm to competition 
through low-pricing is so unlikely, and that the risks of discouraging low prices 
by condemning low-prices are so unbearable that the law should never concern 
itself with the possibility that a dominant firm could cause competitive harm 
through prices that are “too low.”103 
Indeed, the Chicago School104 vision that low-price predation is so difficult 
so as to be non-existent, and therefore, no concern of antitrust is thoroughly 
ingrained in the contemporary case law.105 This view underlies the requirement 
of below-cost pricing found in both Brooke Group and Cascade, and pervades 
contemporary antitrust law.106 Commentators who have urged the adoption of 
                                                                                                             
Report,” which constituted the DOJ’s enforcement policy for single-firm conduct. See 
Christine Varney, Remarks As Prepared for the Center for American Progress on the Vigor-
ous Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era 7 (May 11, 2009), available at 
http://commcns.org/1dYHhfT; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION & MONOPOLY: 
SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 91 (Sept. 2008), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ public/reports/236681.pdf. She expressed concerns with liabil-
ity rules and enforcement policies that focus heavily on short-term competition while giving 
scant attention to longer-term welfare effects of dominant firm conduct. Id. Notably, she 
stated that “extreme hesitancy” in addressing potential abuses by monopoly firms “goes too 
far in evaluating the importance of preserving possible efficiencies and understates the im-
portance of redressing exclusionary and predatory acts that result in harm to competition, 
distort markets, and increase barriers to entry. Id. The ultimate result is that consumers are 
harmed through higher prices, reduced product variety, and slower innovation.” Id. She 
advocated a “back to basics” approach to evaluating single-firm conduct on the belief that 
“an excessive concern for risk of over-deterrence” was unwise. Id. 
 102 Dylan Matthews, Antitrust Was Defined by Robert Bork. I Cannot Overstate His In-
fluence, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2012), http://commcns.org/1bkRbDX. 
 103 BORK, supra note 16, at 154 (“It seems unwise, therefore, to construct rules about a 
phenomenon [price predation] that probably does not exist or which, should it exist in very 
rare cases, the courts would have grave difficulty distinguishing from competitive price 
behavior.  It is almost certain that attempts to apply such rules would do much more harm 
than good.”). 
 104 See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: THEORY & EXE-
CUTION 31 (2005) (noting that the Chicago School of antitrust analysis has been character-
ized as a “pro-market” and “largely anti-interventionist vision of antitrust” based upon neo-
classical economics and the view that “in the long run markets tend to correct their own 
imperfections”); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV. 925 (1979) (describing the “Chicago School” of antitrust analysis and contrasting it 
with the “Harvard School”). 
 105 See Christopher Fallie, Antitrust Consensus Shifting As Courts Weigh Impact of Mo-
nopolists and Predators, FORBES (May 10, 2013), http://commcns.org/1eVZ2dH. 
 106 See, e.g., Matushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986) 
(“[T]here is a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely 
tried, and even more rarely successful.”); Weyerhauser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood 
Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S. 312, 323 (2007) (in the context of predatory bidding, the Court 
repeated that the actions taken as part of a scheme of predation are “often the very essence 
of competition” and that a failed predatory scheme may benefit consumers through lower 
prices) (citations omitted); Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. LinkLine Commc’ns, 555 U.S. 
438, 451 (2009) (“To avoid chilling aggressive price competition, we have carefully limited 
2014] False Negatives Under a Discount Attribution Test 89 
rules meant to protect low prices,107 and courts that have adopted such rules,108 
surely have given careful consideration to the possibility that instances of an-
ticompetitive conduct may go undetected. It is undoubtedly good policy to pro-
tect low-pricing with strong rules designed to protect the incentive to discount, 
and to treat complaints that prices are “too low” in a fairly restrictive manner. 
This policy, however, may appropriately be called into question when the risk 
of false negatives greatly rises, and the associated fear of deterring pro-
competitive price-cutting by imposing a more inclusive liability rule falls. A 
firm’s attempt to shield itself with entry barriers to eliminate latent competitive 
threats via bundling, for example, is quite likely to be safe from liability under 
the discount attribution test in many industries, notably telecommunications 
industries. 109  That there are entire industries where conventional Chicago 
School low-pricing rules yield lots of false negatives110 may undermine, or at 
least call into question, the efficacy of rules that rest on a preference for false 
negatives over false positives and have been crafted so as to allow low-pricing 
even where a particular instance may be anticompetitive. At the very least, it 
raises concerns that the discount attribution test is not an effective mechanism 
for accurately condemning anticompetitive bundled discounts because of its 
special vulnerability to underinclusiveness in many industries. 
                                                                                                             
the circumstances under which plaintiffs can state a Sherman Act claim by alleging that 
prices are too low.”). See also Daniel A. Crane & D. Daniel Sokol, The Antitrust-Busters 
with Gavels, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 26, 2013), http://commcns.org/1hnSTJ6. In their op-ed, Pro-
fessors Crane and Sokol noted that, in contrast to the perverse law of pricing conduct that 
pervaded the 1960s which tended to protect inefficient competitors, “[b]eginning in the 
1980s, the Supreme Court began to recognize that aggressive price-cutting is exactly the sort 
of behavior that antitrust law should encourage, because it helps consumers” and to that end, 
“the justices [have] made clear that any antitrust claim predicated on the argument that a 
firm excluded its rival through low prices would require proof that the defendant engaged in 
predatory, below-cost pricing.” They criticized the result in ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton 
Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012), where the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a 
jury’s liability determination in a case where a company alleged that its competitor had ex-
cluded it through market-share rebates, though without requiring any showing of below-cost 
pricing. They urged the Supreme Court to review the case, and to “reaffirm that above-cost 
discounting cannot be the basis of an antitrust challenge.” Id. The Court ultimately denied 
certiorari in the case. ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2025 (2013). 
 107 See Daniel Fisher, Robert Bork, The Man Who Redefined Antitrust, Is Dead At 85, 
FORBES (Dec. 19, 2012), http://commcns.org/1jqDxrh. 
 108 See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1403 
(7th Cir. 1989) (noting that a firm that increases production in a stagnant market only de-
creases prices, which benefits consumers and is the opposite of a monopoly). 
 109 See infra Part IV for an in-depth discussion. 
 110 See Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Per-
spective, 62 ANTITRUST L. J. 585, 591 (1994) (noting that post-Chicago school economics 
recognizes that “false negatives” can occur in industries where the price-cutter lowers its 
prices to a level below the competitor, but still above its own average cost). 
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To say that articulating a one-size-fits all definition of anticompetitive con-
duct is difficult would be an understatement.111 This is especially true in the 
context of pricing conduct, where the most straightforward method of price 
competition—cost-cutting—may also be a very effective mechanism to ex-
clude existing competitors and potential entrants.112 Indeed, the primary battle-
ground in the law of pricing conduct revolves around the dispute over whether 
low-pricing can ever be anticompetitive if it does not result in a below-cost 
price on a product facing competition, and if so, whether this should be de-
clared illegal in any circumstances.113 The position taken here is that some in-
dustries merit greater concern for false negatives, and that the law rightly con-
cerns itself with addressing anticompetitive low-pricing. Dominant firms may 
erect114 entry barriers without even coming close to pricing below their own 
costs, which is required under the contemporary law on predation as well as by 
the discount attribution test for bundled discounts.115 Strategic entry deterrence 
can indeed be anticompetitive even where it involves price-cutting, and this 
strategy is especially potent where entry barriers are high and the product mar-
kets involved have extremely low marginal costs.116 
                                                
 111 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and 
Anticompetitive Effect, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371 (2002) (providing a historical overview of 
U.S. antitrust law and its inherent tensions). 
 112 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns., Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 451 (2009) (“[C]utting 
prices in order to increase business is often the very essence of competition.”) (quoting Mat-
shushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)). 
 113 The scholarship in this field certainly indicates that this issue is paramount in the 
minds of prominent commentators. Compare, e.g., Edlin, supra note 44, at 941-42 (arguing 
that “there is no compelling reason to restrict predation cases to below-cost pricing, as 
above-cost pricing can also hurt consumers by limiting competition”) with Elhauge, Why 
Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory—and the Implications for 
Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE L.J. 681, 684, 686 (2003) (opposing Edlin’s 
view). 
 114 References in this Article to “erecting” entry barriers refers to what Professor Steven 
Salop has called “strategic” creation of new barriers to entry, which may be distinguished 
from “innocent” entry barriers. According to Salop, innocent barriers are unintentionally 
erected as a side effect of innocent profit maximization. By contrast, a strategic barrier is 
purposely erected to reduce the possibility of entry. Steven C. Salop, Strategic Entry Deter-
rence, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 335 (1979). Although “innocent” entry barriers are not purposely 
created by incumbents in order to stifle entry, they nonetheless may present a favorable 
structural characteristic of the market that can make strategic entry deterrence more effec-
tive for incumbent firms. 
 115 GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968) (a barrier to entry is 
“a condition that imposes higher long-run costs of production on a new entrant than are 
borne by the firms already in the market”). 
 116 Interpreting the holding in the Microsoft antitrust litigation, Professor Eleanor Fox 
summarized “anticompetitive” conduct as follows: “Conduct that intentionally, signifi-
cantly, and without business justification excludes a potential competitor from outlets (even 
though not in the relevant market), where access to those outlets is a necessary though not 
sufficient condition to waging a challenge to a monopolist and fear of the challenge prompts 
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Price-cutting in these industries, in turn, can be used strategically to elimi-
nate competitive checks and ultimately be price-raising. Professor Aaron Edlin, 
in his seminal paper arguing that above-cost predation is of real concern to 
antitrust, contended that “a firm that preserves its monopoly by charging low 
prices only when its rivals make the mistake of entering the market, and only 
until they exit, denies consumers the benefits from competition on the mer-
its.”117 Similarly, Professor Thomas Krattenmaker and Steven Salop have ob-
served that “potential competition [may] provide[] a competitive check on es-
tablished firms distinct from the check that established firms exert on each 
other.”118 Further, if price-cutting is “sharp-shooting,”119—targeted at particular 
anticompetitive threats rather than an efficient attempt to maximize profits — 
the case for finding a given bundled discounting scheme to be anticompetitive 
is bolstered.120 While prices may decrease today under a bundled deal, this does 
not mean that consumers will ultimately benefit and may only reflect a re-
trenchment of established firms.  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that its test would 
protect competition, not competitors, by only condemning bundled discounts 
that would exclude an equally-efficient producer of the competitive product.121 
However, the structure of certain industries supports expanding the class of 
anticompetitive practices reprehended liability rules from exclusion of equally-
efficient rivals to include marginalization of new entrants from the market.122  
                                                                                                             
the conduct, is ‘anticompetitive.’” Fox, supra note 111, at 390, 391. Fox also argued that this 
was not the only test for exclusionary conduct, but that it is “one test in fact applied by 
courts to conduct that significantly forecloses competition on the merits and is not efficiency 
justified.” Id. 
 117 Edlin, supra note 44, at 966. 
 118 Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising 
Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 246 (1986). 
 119 This term is most often used in airline predation, where dominant airlines deliberately 
incur losses in markets where their dominance is threatened. See Chris Sagers, “Rarely 
Tried and . . . Rarely Successful”: Theoretically Impossible Price Predation Among the 
Airlines, 74 J. AIR. L. & COMM. 919, 924 (2009) (quoting Aviation Competition Hearing: 
Before the Subcomm. On Aviation, S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
105th Cong. 1067 (1998)) (“[A]n incumbent . . . that is deliberately accepting financial 
losses selectively in the markets where it is subject to competitive challenge [ ] [is] engaging 
in . . . discriminatory sharp-shooting” and is engaged in predation.) (internal citations omit-
ted). 
 120 In these ways, the Article relies in large part on the Aspen definition of anticompeti-
tive exclusionary conduct. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 
585, 605 (1985). 
 121 See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 910-11 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 122 This is not to suggest that adherents to rules of per se legality for above-cost pricing 
fail to recognize that above-cost pricing can be anticompetitive. The implication here is that 
market structures, which are prevalent in the economy may be of such a character that an-
ticompetitive low-pricing is much easier to carry out given certain structural characteristics. 
As a result, the short shrift given to the possibility of false negatives supports altering the 
rules to capture practices that are not usually thought to threaten competition. 
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Harm to competition does not arise solely when a competitor is sidelined by a 
predatory scheme, but also results from exclusion of new companies123 from a 
market, a result that can be accomplished using above-cost bundled dis-
counts.124 What a strict price-cost test lacks, therefore, is the ability to address 
bundled discount programs that amount to anticompetitive125 strategic entry 
deterrence strategies.126 These strategies may deprive consumers of the salient 
effects of new entry, even by firms who are not yet as efficient as the incum-
bents. In other words, there is good reason to consider the effects that new en-
trants—even less efficient ones—will have on consumer welfare. As Edlin has 
put it, “[i]nefficient rivals often provide important competition, or at least 
could provide important competition if competition law limited their exclu-
sion.” 127 There is also a strong argument to be made that the Cascade court’s 
reliance on Brooke Group was faulty in the first instance. The direct and im-
mediate benefit that consumers gain from single-product price-cutting pro-
vided the concern for false positives, which largely drove the outcome in 
Brooke Group, but these concerns may not be present in the bundling con-
text.128 
Critics of the decision in LePage’s generally express dismay that the Third 
Circuit did not require a showing of below-cost pricing, but instead, employed 
an approach that could wind up protecting inefficient competitors and discour-
aging aggressive discounting by dominant firms.129 However, opponents of 
                                                
 123 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54 (explaining that 
“[n]othing in § 2 of the Sherman Act limits its prohibition to actions taken against threats 
that are already well-developed enough to serve as present substitutes”). 
 124 See, e.g., Jamie L. Weber, Backing Bundled Discounts After Brooke Group: Analyz-
ing the Debate Over the Legality of Above-Cost Bundled Discounts, 94 IOWA L. REV. 775, 
789 (2009) (noting that in addition to using a bundled discount as a predatory tool to ex-
clude an existing equally-efficient rival, firms can also harm competition by using a bundled 
discount to exclude new firms from entering the market). 
 125 In this article, the term “predatory” is reserved for below-cost bundling. 
 126 See Salop, supra note 114, at 533. 
 127 EDLIN, supra note 38, at 164. 
 128 See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 27, at 5 (“Whether a particular instance of bundling does 
or does not create consumer surplus in a particular case would depend on the circumstances. 
Not so with predatory pricing, in which every penny of lower prices during the ‘pre recoup-
ment’ phase inures to the benefit of consumers.”) (emphasis in original). 
 129 The Antitrust Modernization Commission lamented that the decision “offers no clear 
standards by which firms can assess whether their bundled rebates are likely to pass antitrust 
muster.” ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REP. & RECOMMENDATION 94 (2007); see 
also Elai Katz, Market-Share Discounts Scrutinized by Third Circuit, 248 N.Y. L.J. 120, 212 
(2012) (“The Third Circuit remains a vexing jurisdiction for dominant firms that discount 
aggressively. The 2003 en banc opinion of the court in LePage’s v. 3M…left an inexact 
standard for bundled discounts.”). But see Rubin, supra note 27, at 8 (“[T]he LePage’s deci-
sion was not ‘standardless,’ as the AMC and others have portrayed it. LePage’s demon-
strated that the Aspen rule could provide reasonably good guidance to juries and judges 
charged with evaluating the lawfulness of bundling and other exclusionary pricing strate-
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LePage’s, while correct that the decision may actually harm consumers in the 
long run, should take pause in relying on a strict cost-based rule. This is be-
cause there is great potential for dominant firms to use above-cost bundled dis-
counts to exclude new competitors from their markets, by offering bundled 
discount programs in ways that do not constitute “competition on the mer-
its.”130  A rule insulating all anticompetitive bundling so long as it is above-
cost,131 in turn, poses a threat to competition that may not easily be appreciated. 
Concluding that a firm’s low prices may actually be a part of an anticompeti-
tive strategy to shut out new firms is also likely to be at odds with intuition. 
But once it is recognized that cost-based rules are prophylactic in nature, and 
are concerned with the chilling effects of false positives on incentives to cut 
price, reliance on such a rule becomes less attractive in many circumstances.132 
In attempting to decrease the incidence of these Type I errors and the social 
cost associated with them, a rule of above-cost legality provides courts with a 
blunt tool, and not a scalpel, for assessing competitive effects. Being left with 
such an imprecise rule has significant consequences in industries like tele-
communications, where fixed costs are extremely high and variable costs ex-
tremely low, since the accuracy of a price-cost test crumbles when applied in 
such markets. As the following illustration based on the Quad Play shows,133 it 
would do well to replace the Cascade rule with one that that would allow a 
plaintiff to prove harm to competition even where a bundling firm prices above 
cost. 
V. USING THE QUAD PLAY AS AN ANTICOMPETITIVE 
DEVICE WITHOUT OFFENDING THE LAW 
The preceding section argued that above-cost discounted prices can indeed 
be anticompetitive.134 There, I took the position that a rule of above-cost legal-
                                                                                                             
gies.”). 
 130 See Edlin, supra note 44, at 952 (explaining that predatory pricing arises when a firm 
charges abnormally low prices in order to drive rivals from the market, which do not reflect 
competition on the merits). 
 131 See id. at 941-42 (arguing that “above-cost predation” may be more plausible and 
prevalent that below-cost predation). 
 132 This is not to imply that the potential for underinclusiveness is totally lost on critics 
of LePage’s.  Indeed, many who favor prophylactic, cost-based rules do so because they 
believe the risk of false positives under an alternative rule outweighs the risk of false nega-
tives under a rule of above-cost legality.  However, what this Article does suggest is that the 
incidence of false negatives is much greater than proponents of Cascade Health Solutions or 
Brooke Group probably imagine. The example of the quad play bundle provides one exam-
ple.  For others, see Part VI, infra. 
 133 See infra Part IV. 
 134 See supra Part III. 
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ity is merely a prophylactic rule.135 This section now posits a situation where a 
quad play bundle is sold in an anticompetitive way, yet in a way that would not 
offend the discount attribution test. The exercise illustrates a “false negative” 
(i.e., a type II error).136 It uses hypothetical numerical price values to illustrate 
the possibility of this particular outcome. Of course, it is important to distin-
guish bundled discounts that constitute vigorous, pro-competitive price compe-
tition from those that are anticompetitive. As Robert Bork memorably stated, 
we must distinguish “exclusion through efficiency from exclusion by means 
unrelated to efficiency.”137 Generally understood, this concern is reflected in 
the below-cost pricing requirement contained in both the Brooke Group and 
Cascade tests.138 That is, courts have decided, as a matter of policy, that a law 
permitting challenges to above-cost pricing would present inappropriate risks 
of over-inclusion (i.e., false positives) and as a result, would deter aggressive 
price competition to the detriment of consumers.139 As provided for in Brooke 
Group, the law on predation has reflected a preference for false negatives over 
false positives, on the theory that this arrangement is better for consumers.140 In 
order to show that the theory underlying the decision to strike this balance may 
actually be misconceived, this section concludes by briefly describing the 
prevalence of markets with high fixed costs and extremely low average vari-
able costs; the kinds of markets where the incidence of false negatives is likely 
to be a great deal higher than the Brooke Group or Cascade courts could have 
imagined. 
 
A. A Hypothetical Application of the Discount Attribution Test 
 
Assume that one of the Cable Defendants offers all three “triple play” com-
ponents for $50 each per month, and that Verizon Wireless offers standard 
wireless service for $50 per month. Sold individually (i.e., unbundled), these 
products would cost a consumer $200 per month. As a four-part quad play 
bundle, suppose that Verizon Wireless would reduce the package price from 
$200 to $154.  The total discount on the bundle is now $46 per month. Attrib-
uting that discount entirely to the competitive wireless product yields an effec-
tive price of $4.00 per month. Lastly, assume that Verizon’s average variable 
cost for wireless phone service is close to zero, perhaps $3.00 per month. Un-
                                                
 135 See id. 
 136 Stout, supra note 35 (defining and discussing these terms in the context of securities 
law). 
 137 BORK, supra note 16, at 39. 
 138 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 210 
(1993); Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 139 Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 908-09. 
 140 Id. 
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der these circumstances, the competitive product in the bundle is being offered 
above its average variable cost of production. Accordingly, a single-product 
rival of Verizon Wireless’s lawsuit would be dismissed in a jurisdiction using 
the discount attribution test.141 Due to the low average variable costs on the 
competitive product, any bundled discount up to $47.01 would be legal.142 
However, as the next section will discuss,143 Verizon could harm competition in 
wireless service without employing a discount quite so large. 
The hypothetical application of the discount attribution test above shows 
that an equally efficient single-product competitor of Verizon Wireless would 
not be excluded from the wireless market under the given conditions. Since it 
too could provide wireless service at $3.00 per month or less, it would not be 
forced to price below cost in order to meet a bundled discount yielding an ef-
fective price of $4.00 per month for wireless service. But the chief problem is 
that the discount attribution test does not account for anticompetitive entry-
limitation strategies,144 and is solely concerned that a less-inclusive prophylac-
tic rule would protect an inefficient existing competitor.145 It does not account 
for the fact that in certain industries like telecommunications, high fixed costs 
already pose a high barrier to entry, and because average variable costs of pro-
duction for wireless service are only a few dollars per month (or a few cents 
per minute),146 showing below-cost pricing on the competitive product in the 
bundle would be nearly impossible in the mine run of cases in this industry. 
Bundled discounts, while involving some “pro-competitive” short-term price-
cutting, may also allow a dominant firm to put a new entrant out of business if 
the new firm cannot reach minimum efficient scale, let alone recover its fixed 
costs.147 Or it may allow the dominant firm to convince a potential entrant to 
stay out of the market altogether. As these prospects indicate, above-cost pric-
                                                
 141 To survive a motion to dismiss, it would have to allege that the Cox-Verizon bundle 
was offering a discount of $47.01 under the posited price and cost values. 
 142 In other words, any discount up to that level would still yield a price on wireless that 
is above the average variable cost on that component of the bundle, when the full discount 
on the bundle is attributed only to that product. 
 143 See infra Part IV.B. 
 144 See Salop, supra note 114, at 79. 
 145 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUNDLED DISCOUNTS AND SINGLE PRODUCT LOYALTY DISCOUNTS, at 
99-100, http://commcns.org/1aN0BeN. 
 146 Although I refer to “marginal costs” at various points in this Article, the Cascade test 
uses average variable cost to determine whether or not a discount is “below cost” or not. 
The conclusions drawn here should not change based on which measure of cost is used, as 
marginal cost and average variable cost are similar in the industries discussed. The operative 
intuition for the purposes of this Article are that in certain industries, wireless mobile serv-
ices being the example used here, the increase in cost that is incurred from serving an addi-
tional customer is negligible for an efficient wireless network. Average variable cost is often 
used to approximate marginal cost, since marginal cost is difficult to measure. Areeda & 
Turner, supra note 10, at 716.    
 147 See generally Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 118, at 214. 
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ing does not necessarily indicate pro-competitive, or competitively-neutral 
conduct. The Court in Brooke Group itself acknowledged that above-cost pric-
ing, though henceforth not to be deemed illegal, could still be anticompeti-
tive.148 It stated that above-cost pricing “either reflects the lower cost structure 
of the alleged predator or is beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal 
to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-
cutting.”149 It is quite clear that the Court understood that above-cost pricing 
can still be anticompetitive, and that it opted for an above-cost safe harbor 
based on concerns for false positives and institutional competence.150 The Court 
did not abandon the notion that above-cost pricing schemes can be exclusion-
ary and anticompetitive.151 
The above-cost safe harbor contained in the discount attribution test cre-
ates—and indeed may invite—the ability to market the quad play to limit entry 
into the market for wireless service for anticompetitive reasons.152 The discount 
attribution test requires a showing of below-cost pricing, but that will be very 
difficult to prove in many cases, even where the net effect of the bundling 
strategy is to reduce consumer welfare.153  Average variable costs, the measure 
of cost relied upon by the test, is calculated by dividing variable cost by out-
put.154 Wireless mobile service operators like Verizon Wireless experience tre-
mendous economies of scale in production with average variable costs near 
zero. 155 The discount attribution test thus gives bundling firms a lot of leeway 
in which to discount a bundle without permitting a finding of liability because 
discounts on the non-competitive products are allocated to a competitive prod-
uct with very low average variable costs.156 This broad space for discounting 
                                                
 148 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993). 
 149 Id. (emphasis added). 
 150 See id. at 227. 
 151 Id. at 224. 
 152 See id. at 209 (holding that any simple price cut in the single-product context, result-
ing in a price exceeding the seller’s cost, is immune from antitrust liability); see also supra 
Part I. 
 153 Jonathan B. Jacobson, A Note on Loyalty Discounts, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 7, June 
2010, http://commcns.org/1hPbrTm. 
 154 ROBERT PINDYCK & DANIEL RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 237 (8th ed. 2013); see 
also Unilateral Conduct Workbook Chapter 4: Predatory Pricing Analysis, INT’L COMPETI-
TION NETWORK, UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKING GRP., 25 (Apr. 2012), available at 
http://commcns.org/1atbTHx [hereinafter ICN Report]. 
 155 See, e.g., Max Schanzenbach, Network Effects and Antitrust Law: Predation, Affirma-
tive Defenses and the Case of U.S. v. Microsoft, STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, 15 (2002) (observ-
ing that many networks have declining marginal costs with near zero average variable 
costs). 
 156 ICN Report, supra note 154, at 26-27. International Competition Network Working 
Group on Unilateral Conduct has considered the implications of using various cost measures 
in fashioning a framework for predatory pricing more generally. With regard to using aver-
age variable cost as the standard for a cost-based rule, it concluded the following: “[A] cost 
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raises the leeway for firms to use bundling to deter entry into the wireless mar-
ket by firms that would become as efficient as the existing firms.157 Anticom-
petitive strategies may be immune from scrutiny under the discount attribution 
test because it relies only on a price-cost standard.158 
 
B. Bundled Discounts and Anticompetitive Entry Deterrence in the Market 
for Mobile Wireless 
 
Recall Bork’s admonition that the law should not interfere with efficient 
conduct that may also happen to “exclude.”159 Professor Susan Crawford has 
recently offered some observations on the market structure in wireless mobile 
service that buttresses the a priori conclusion that bundled discounts in this 
industry would best be labeled as anticompetitive and exclusionary, rather effi-
cient (but also exclusionary).160 According to Crawford, there is “no serious 
competition” in mobile, which is dominated by four large carriers who are able 
to set prices and earn margins of roughly 40 percent. Further, Crawford ob-
serves that, “barriers to entry for any new national player are insurmount-
able.” 161  According to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 
“[s]ervice provider entry and exit decisions are primarily determined by the 
height of structural entry barriers and expected post-entry market profitability 
.”162 Likewise, there are two primary ways in which a bundled discount on the 
quad play could be used to deter entry into the wireless market: (1) by creating 
a multi-tiered entry problem and (2) by facilitating a limit pricing strategy.163 
These two anticompetitive strategies go to the heart of a new wireless firm’s 
entry decision. Furthermore, a bundled discount program designed to insulate 
incumbent firms with entry barriers is of heightened competitive concern in the 
wireless market, as opposed to other markets where the conditions are ripe for 
                                                                                                             
measure from the lower end of the scale (e.g., average variable cost) may yield an enforce-
ment standard that is more lenient, which . . .could produce more type II errors, or ‘false 
negatives,’ (i.e., result in anticompetitive conduct going undetected.” Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Thomas A. Lambert, Weyerhauser and the Search for Antitrust’s Holy Grail, CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 277, 304 (2007) (Professor Lambert has identified the two primary ways in 
which equally-efficient rival tests are prone to producing false negatives: they do not con-
demn practices that prevent rivals from becoming as efficient as the defendant, and they 
may permit exclusion of the only competition a dominant firm is likely to face if that com-
petition is less efficient than the dominant firm). 
 159 See infra note 137. 
 160 See CRAWFORD, supra note 56, at 158. 
 161 Id. 
 162 In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1993, Fifteenth Report, WT Docket No. 10-133, ¶ 59 (June 27, 2011), available at 
http://commcns.org/1hPbLBz [hereinafter Fifteenth Wireless Competition Report]. 
 163 Rubinfield, supra note 46, at 257-58, 261. 
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strategic entry deterrence.164 This market is already highly concentrated165 and 
entry barriers are already extremely high,166 making attempts to exclude new-
comers even more effective in their potential to harm consumers. 
One might argue that selling products close to cost is the paradigm of pro-
competitive, welfare-enhancing conduct. Indeed, purchasers of a four-part 
bundle would certainly be thrilled to receive wireless service almost free-of-
charge. But what this argument, as well as the discount attribution test, leave 
unaddressed is the ability to use steep discounts on an ad hoc basis to limit en-
try into the wireless market (e.g., by offering retail discounts only when new 
wireless firms are actively readying to enter the market).167 Because it only asks 
if the competitive product is sold below cost if all discounts are allocated to it, 
the test would not prohibit strategic discounting designed to shelter Verizon 
Wireless from future competition.168 With respect to the case of the quad play, 
the test is a poor fit for analyzing bundled discounts in a market that is already 
characterized by high concentration and multiple substantial barriers to entry.169 
But more broadly, the test’s core concern with protecting efficient conduct by 
dominant firms obscures the importance of reprehending acts that raise new 
barriers to entry.170 Raising barriers removes competitive checks that ordinarily 
spur innovation and reduction of prices across the board.171 
                                                
 164 As noted above, although wireless mobile has been deemed the “competitive market” 
for the purposes of applying the discount attribution test, it may or may not be “competitive” 
in the conventional sense. See supra, note 59 and accompanying text. 
 165 See David Cline, Consumer Choice: Is There an App for That?, 10 J. TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 147, 148-49 (2012) (noting that four firms dominate the wireless market, 
resulting in a Herfindahl-Hirshman Index ranging from 2000-6000, and that the DOJ Anti-
trust Division views concentration over 1800 as raising significant competitive concerns); 
see also T. Randolph Beard et al., A Policy Framework for Spectrum Allocation in Mobile 
Wireless Communications, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 639, 647 (2011) (“The potential for concen-
tration in the wireless sector is especially acute due to the barrier to entry posed by the lim-
ited availability of spectrum.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 166 According to the FCC, the primary barriers to entry in the wireless industry are: “(1) 
the cost of acquiring spectrum licenses or spectrum leases; (2) network coverage costs such 
as site acquisition and preparation costs, site construction and leasing costs, network equip-
ment costs, backhaul transportation costs, and other potential interconnection and roaming 
costs; (3) the costs of offering customers a portfolio of attractive wireless devices; and (4) 
the costs of marketing an distributing wireless services and devices.” Fifteenth Wireless 
Competition Report, supra note 162, ¶ 60. 
 167 Mark S. Popofsky, Section 2, Safe Harbors, and The Rule Of Reason, 15 GEO. MA-
SON L. REV. 1265, 1290 (2008). 
 168 Id. 
 169 See CRAWFORD, supra note 56, at 158 (discussing high barriers to entry); Cline, supra 
note 165, at 148-49 (noting that four firms dominate the wireless market, resulting in a Her-
findahl-Hirshman Index ranging from 2000-6000, and that the DOJ Antitrust Division views 
concentration over 1800 as raising significant competitive concerns). 
 170 Popofsky, supra note 167, at 1290. 
 171 Daniel E. Lazaroff, Entry Barriers and Contemporary Antitrust Litigation, 7 U.C. 
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 1, 26 (2006). 
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1. Multi-tiered Entry Problems 
 
Daniel Crane explains the multi-tiered entry problem as a strategy that 
“raises a rivals’ costs by forcing it to enter two or more markets simultaneously 
in order to be able to meet the incumbent’s contingent discounts.”172 Assuming 
that most consumers desire all four products in a quad play bundle, a new wire-
less entrant would not only need to attempt entry into the wireless market, but 
would also need to attempt multi-tiered entry into voice, video and broadband 
markets in order to make consumers indifferent as to which firm they purchase 
wireless service from.173 Erecting this sort of entry barrier would be likely to 
deter entry even by a hopeful wireless firm that could provide the service as 
efficiently as Verizon Wireless.174 But the multi-tiered entry barrier posed in 
this scenario is even more severe.  It is exacerbated by the difficulty of entering 
into the markets for voice, video and broadband, which would be necessary for 
a rival wireless firm to offer its own four-part bundle.175 That is, entry barriers 
are already high in the markets for video service and broadband Internet serv-
ice.176 While bundling as a general matter increases barriers to entry, the prob-
                                                
 172 Crane, supra note 17, at 446. 
 173 A firm faced with the prospect of multi-tiered entry could certainly partner up with a 
provider of complementary products in order to offer its own competing bundle. Interest-
ingly, the facts of the Quad play case provide insight into how a firm like Verizon Wireless, 
which wants to sell a four-part bundle pursuant to a cross-seller arrangement with various 
cable companies, can also foreclose this avenue of competition. Specifically, the DOJ notes 
that the Cable Defendants have a national market share for incumbent cable companies of 
greater than 50% in these product markets and each has market power in numerous local 
markets for broadband and video. As far as the DOJ is concerned, the “unlimited duration” 
of the wireless exclusivity is anticompetitive because the ability to sell wireless services “in 
combination with video or broadband services” may become an important component of 
wireless competition, and the unlimited exclusivity would unreasonably foreclose compet-
ing wireless firms from offering integrated bundles with “the most significant providers of 
video and broadband services.” Similarly, it would harm the ability of rival wireless carriers 
to “provide constituent parts of those bundles.” See Competitive Impact Statement, supra 
note 34, at 8-22. However, a full elaboration on the competitive effects resulting from cross-
seller bundling is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 174 See Rubinfield, supra note 46, at 257 (“A bundled rebate program could also increase 
entry barriers by creating a two-level entry problem, forcing new entrants to enter a second 
(or third) market in order to compete for the monopoly profits in its initial market. Such a 
strategy could arguably be successful even if the monopolist did not price below its own 
cost.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 175 Rubinfield, supra note 46, at 257. 
 176 See generally Konstantinos K. Stylianou, An Innovation-Centric Approach of Tele-
communications Infrastructure Regulation, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 221, 241 (noting large sunk 
costs, high entry barriers and network effects in the telecommunications industry); see also 
Allen P. Grunes & Maurice E. Stucke, Antitrust Review of the AT&T/T-Mobile Transaction, 
64 FED. COMM. L.J. 47, 55 (“The inputs necessary to enter [into the market for mobile wire-
less telecommunications] include spectrum, towers, network equipment, and backhaul facili-
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lem is worsened where all or most of the packaged products come from mar-
kets with substantial existing barriers.177 
A hypothetical will serve to more fully illustrate the anticompetitive nature 
of bundling of this sort. Suppose that the discount offered by Verizon Wireless 
was so large that the incremental payment that customers had to make in order 
to add wireless service to the traditional “triple play” was less than it would 
cost a potential entrant to enter the wireless market. Suppose also that the po-
tential entrant was actually more efficient than Verizon at providing wireless 
service, and that entry into voice, video and broadband would provide it with 
no efficiencies. On these assumptions, a large discount of the sort posited in 
Part IV on the four-part bundle could deny the more efficient potential entrant 
the scale it would need to compete in the wireless market.178 Of course, a firm 
that already competes in the voice, video, or broadband markets may have an 
easier time contesting the wireless market, as its existing operations could 
serve to mitigate the difficulty of multi-tiered entry. But relying solely on ex-
isting telecommunications firms to contest these markets only serves to bring 
the entry problems described above into sharper relief. 
 
2. Limit Pricing 
  
Using bundling to deter entry by way of limit pricing is similar to the strat-
egy described in the prior paragraph,179 but does not depend on raising rivals’ 
costs. Instead, it is a pricing strategy designed to convince potential entrants of 
the unprofitability of entering the market.180 The basic idea is that “an estab-
lished firm may be able to influence, through its current pricing policy alone, 
other firms’ perceptions of the profitability of entering the firm’s markets, and 
that the firm may thus set its prices below their short run maximizing levels in 
order to deter entry.”181 This tactic could be employed when it looks as though 
                                                                                                             
ties. We doubt there can be a serious claim that entry is easy.”); Richard Whitt, Evolving 
Broadband Policy: Taking Adaptive Steps to Foster Optimal Internet Platforms, 17 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 417, 488 (“Broadband networks. . . exhibit significant economies 
of scale and scope, require access to patents, rights of way, and spectrum, and exhibit net-
work externalities. In particular, costs generated from installing networks, establishing bill-
ing and support systems, and acquiring customers constitute substantial barriers to entry.”). 
 177 J. Shahar Dillbary, Predatory Bundling and the Exclusionary Standard, 67 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1231, 1250-51 (2010). 
 178 This hypothetical is adapted from one that Professor Rubinfeld used in his paper on 
bundled rebates. See Rubinfield, supra note 46, at 258. 
 179 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 180 Dillbary, supra note 177, at 1250-51. 
 181 Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Informa-
tion: An Equilibrium Analysis, 50 ECONOMETRICA 443, 443 (1982) (internal citation omit-
ted). 
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there is potential entry by a new wireless firm.182  Under incomplete informa-
tion about the incumbent firm’s actual costs, a large but above-cost bundled 
discount would likely cause the potential entrant to conclude that entry is un-
wise and decide against it.183 In other words, in a market like wireless service, 
where firms face large sunk costs, a bundled discount arrangement that brings 
expected profits practically down to marginal cost, as posited above, would 
likely undermine the incentive to enter by signaling to a potential entrant that 
the likelihood of a reasonable return on investment is slim.  Even more, when 
used in a targeted fashion,184 limit pricing of this sort could convince a potential 
entrant that it would not even cover its fixed costs, let alone make a profit.185 
The Solicitor General’s Office, writing as amicus curiae for the United States 
in LePage’s, also suggested that the act of bundling is distinct from low prices 
that result and, consequently, low-pricing through bundling may have a greater 
potential to harm competition than single-product price cuts.186 However, the 
literature does not contain an in-depth analysis of how and whether limit pric-
ing via bundled discounts poses a greater potential for anticompetitive harm 
than limit pricing via single-product price-cutting.187 
Nevertheless, as in the multi-tiered entry scenario, it is in this type of situa-
tion that low-pricing could actually have an anticompetitive effect, contrary to 
the usual intuition that lower prices are unquestionably good for consumers 
and must denote pro-competitive conduct. By excluding potential entrants who 
do not have the opportunity to achieve as equal efficiency as the dominant 
firm, limit pricing is a tactic that strategically employs low prices to keep new 
competitors out of the market.188 It does not do so by offering a superior prod-
                                                
 182 Dillbary, supra note 177, at 1250-51. 
 183 Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 181, at 443. 
 184 See Sagers, supra note 119, at 924. 
 185 See Unilateral Conduct Workbook Chapter 4: Predatory Pricing Analysis, supra note 
154, at 24 (“Note that the AVC [average variable cost] benchmark is in general not able to 
capture a concern that the alleged predator may be deterring entry or expansion (as opposed 
to inducing exit). This is because, if the competitor has not yet entered the market . . .it 
would not enter . . .unless price were projected to be sufficiently above AVC to allow it to 
recoup the additional (sunk) fixed costs of entry. In this case, a standard based on AVC may 
be seen to result in underenforcement, as an ‘equally efficient competitor’ may not be able 
to enter or to expand even if the dominant firm priced (somewhat) above AVC.”). See also 
Crane, supra note 17, at 447 (“In a market characterized by high sunk costs, a mixed bun-
dling scheme might deter entry by a new firm that concluded that the profitability margins 
available under the mixed bundling scheme would not allow an adequate return on its in-
vestment.”). 
 186 Amicus Curiae Br. At 12-13, 3M, Inc. v. LePage’s 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 953 (2004). 
 187 See, e.g., Dillbary, supra note 177, at 1250-51 (discussing bundle discounts that may 
be beneficial); Rubinfield, supra note 46, at 258 (discussing bundles rebates); Crane, supra 
note 17, at 446 (discussing bundle discounts). 
 188 Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Informa-
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uct that new entrants are unable to match (i.e., “competition on the merits”), 
but by convincing them to stay out altogether by exploiting monopoly power in 
related markets. Indeed, the effectiveness of this entry-limitation strategy 
would be enhanced in the wireless market because the high sunk costs189 in the 
telecommunications sector would more quickly lead a firm to decide against 
entry when faced with a signal that the entry investment is not worth making. 
VI. FALSE NEGATIVES ARE MORE COMMON THAN BROOKE 
GROUP OR CASCADE IMAGINED: CALLING INTO 
QUESTION THE DECISION-THEORETIC APPROACH TO 
BUNDLED DISCOUNTS 
The prior section discussed some of the particular ways in which above-cost 
bundled discounts might be employed in anticompetitive ways while surviving 
the strictures of the discount attribution test.190 Normatively, this sort of obser-
vation should not ordinarily matter all that much; merely demonstrating that a 
given legal framework is sometimes underinclusive is of no great moment. 
However, as this section will attempt to demonstrate, the prevalence of false 
negatives under the discount attribution test is much higher than its proponents 
might imagine and, as a result, the Cascade court’s implicit reliance on deci-
sion theory191 is not as defensible as it might initially seem. 
 
A. The Prevalence of Industries Prone to False Negatives 
 
This Article has thus far argued that high fixed costs in bundling product 
markets, coupled with very low marginal costs in bundling product markets is 
                                                                                                             
tion: An Equilibrium Analysis, 50 ECONOMETRICA 443, 443 (1982) (internal citation omit-
ted) (The dominate firm influences “other firms’ perceptions of the profitability of entering 
the firm’s markets, and . . . set[s] its prices [low] in order to deter entry.”). 
 189 Grunes & Stucke, supra note 176, at 54-55 (citing In the Matter of Implementation of 
Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 25 F.C.C.R. 11407, 
11495, Chart 6 (2010)) (discussing the types of sunk costs necessary to enter the mobile 
wireless network). 
 190 See supra Part IV.B. 
 191 See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895, 918-19 (9th Cir. 2007), 
opinion amended and superseded, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[Notwithstanding] 
aware[ness] that liability under the discount attribution standard has the potential to sweep . 
. . broadly, . . . limited judicial experience [counsels for such standard because it will] allow 
these difficult issues to further percolate in the lower courts . . . [and it is the preferable op-
tion p]ending further judicial and academic inquiry into the prevalence of anticompetitive 
bundled discounts.”). See also Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 39, at 82-83 (“[W]hen courts 
lack enough information to determine whether particular business conduct will promote 
consumer welfare, harm it, or leave it undisturbed . . . courts and agencies are forced to for-
mulate doctrine in the dark . . . [and generally] have done so by employing the decision 
theory [which] . . . often suggests a preference for . . . false negatives.”). 
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a combination which yields a particular vulnerability to false negatives under 
the discount attribution test.192 The example of the quad play bundle has been 
used to illustrate, on a more practical level, precisely how this kind of error 
might play out in reality. The reason this observation matters for antitrust is 
that there is strong evidence that these Type II errors arise in a non-trivial 
number of cases.193 Indeed, there is good reason to believe that there is an en-
tire sector of the economy whose structure is wholly inapposite to the applica-
tion of the discount attribution test, because the requirement of below-cost 
pricing effectively shields any above-cost bundled discount, even where it is 
anticompetitive in effect.194 Of course, occasional instances of underinclusive-
ness are not of great concern, but the concern for under-enforcement should 
grow when the prevalence of Type II errors grows.  The so-called “New Econ-
omy,” presents such a case.195 The New Economy has been defined to include 
“computers, software programs, Internet-based goods and services, [and] bio-
technology,”196 and is generally “characterized by large initial investments 
(‘fixed costs’) and low costs to reproduce individual items (‘variable costs’).197 
Software firms, to take one particular example, have high fixed costs,198 and 
near zero marginal costs.199 Professor Michael Carrier has concluded that these 
                                                
 192 See supra Part IV.B. 
 193 See discussion supra notes 162-64. 
 194 See, e.g., Schanzenbach, supra note 155, at 71 (describing network industries as “de-
clining cost industries” that can easily “justify a low price by pointing to low marginal costs 
or the claim (probably true) that costs will decline or that value will increase as they expand 
supply.”). 
 195 See Sunny Woan, Antitrust in Wonderland: Regulating Markets of Innovation, 27 
TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 53 (2008). 
 196 Woan, supra note 195, at 56. Woan also points out that “[t]raditional product markets 
generally experience the opposite: the model of perfect competition is characterized by low 
fixed costs and higher variable costs.” Id. at 62. She further notes that there are other indus-
tries, besides those in the New Economy, that are characterized by high fixed costs and low 
variable costs. Id. at 62, n.96 (citing Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Anti-
trust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, Pre-
pared Remarks Before the Antitrust, Technology and Intellectual Property Conference at the 
Berkeley Center for Law and Technology (Mar. 2, 2001)). See also Marleina Paz, Almost 
But Not Quite: The Past, Present, and Potential Future of Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 
45 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1053, 1095 (2012) (“Another trait of technology-based industries is 
that there are initial high fixed costs and subsequent low variable costs related to creating 
new products for consumers . . . After these high fixed costs are incurred, companies experi-
ence low variable costs because reproducing the good or service is much cheaper than the 
initial investment.”) (citations omitted). 
 197 Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: 
Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, Prepared Remarks Before the Anti-
trust, Technology and Intellectual Property Conference at the Berkeley Center for Law and 
Technology (Mar. 2, 2001). 
 198 Schanzenbach, supra note 155, at 8. 
 199 See id. (noting that software products generally have low marginal costs); Steven D. 
Houck, Injury to Competition/Consumers in High Tech Cases, 75 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 593, 
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firms “usually have high fixed costs, because of significant R&D investments 
or the need to invest in networks, but low marginal costs, because the cost of 
producing an additional unit is insignificant.”200 In these ways, the New Econ-
omy is structurally similar to the telecommunications industry. There is good 
reason to believe that the application of the discount attribution test to bundled 
discounts in the New Economy would produce similar results to the hypotheti-
cal result in the case of the quad play.201 Accurately evaluating bundled dis-
counts in these industries will likely run into the same problems as those iden-
tified in the case of the quad play bundle. 
 
B. Decision Theory in Pricing Conduct Cases 
 
Simply put, decision theory is “the branch of microeconomics concerned 
with optimal choice in the presence of uncertainty.”202 Devlin and Jacobs note 
that, “error is uniquely prevalent in this field because antitrust is routinely 
called upon to deliver answers to unsolvable problems.”203 In antitrust, as this 
Article has pointed out, the modern law reflects a decided preference for false 
negatives over false positives.204 This is explicit in decisions such as Matsu-
shita205 and Brooke Group,206 as well as the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cas-
cade.207 This approach, in the context of evaluating pricing conduct, also opera-
tionalized Bork’s insight that “predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and 
even more rarely successful.”208 Thus, the modern preference for false nega-
tives over false positives is based upon a combination of factors: false positives 
                                                                                                             
601 (2001) (noting that marginal costs in intellectual property industries often approach 
zero). See also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (reciting 
Microsoft’s counsel’s admission at oral argument that Java and Navigator’s “marginal costs 
[were] essentially zero”). 
 200 Carrier, supra note 41, at 815. 
 201 See, e.g., Schanzenbach, supra note 155, at 69-71 (explaining how “declining cost 
industries” can easily “justify a low price by pointing to low marginal costs”); Paz, supra 
note 196, at 1095 (explaining that once the “high fixed costs are incurred, companies expe-
rience low variable costs because reproducing the good or service is much cheaper than the 
initial investment”) (citations omitted)). 
 202 Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 39, at 83. 
 203 Id. at 79. 
 204 See, e.g., id. 
 205 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-91, 
593-95 (1986). 
 206 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220-24 
(1993). 
 207 See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895, 911, 918-19 (9th Cir. 
2007), opinion amended and superseded, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 208 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590-91 (1986) 
(citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF, 149-55 
(1978)). 
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chill vigorous price competition and anticompetitive harm through low-pricing 
is extremely rare,209 in addition to other factors not considered here.210 
As the prior sub-section argued, the rub in the decision-theoretic approach is 
that false negatives are not as rare or even uncommon as the approach assumes 
them to be, or at least as the court in Cascade thought them to be. As a result, 
the use of conventional decision theory in evaluating bundled discounts is less 
justified than the Ninth Circuit would have it.211 Since the use of this theory is 
at least in part driven by the notion that competitive harm from low-pricing is 
relatively uncommon,212 a finding that this is actually common undermines the 
justification for using it in this context. Moreover, there is no indication in the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision that the court considered the possibility that its rule of 
above-cost legality would produce these types of errors.213 Perhaps counsel 
                                                
 209 Michael Salinger’s analysis of Matshusita’s legacy provides a helpful distillation of 
the concerns that undergird the modern law’s approach to uncertainty in adjudicating pricing 
conduct. Michael Salinger, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 475, 477 (2007). He points to several impor-
tant statements in that decision, including: “predator pricing schemes are rarely tried, and 
even more rarely successful” and “mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are espe-
cially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.” 
Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 
(1986)). 
 210 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-3 
(1984). Easterbrook’s argument was that the market will correct erroneous condemnation of 
a given business practice produces a larger social cost than erroneous acceptance of an an-
ticompetitive business practice. For example, he argued that, “judicial errors that tolerate 
baleful practices are self-correcting, while erroneous condemnations are not.” Id. at 3. 
 211 Jonathan Rubin has argued against using decision theory in the context of bundled 
discounts, but for different reasons than those proposed here. Rubin, supra note 27, at 5-6. 
Rather than examining the efficacy of the approach in certain markets, as is the method used 
here, Rubin argues that that the differences between bundled discounts and single-product 
predatory pricing are such that the use of decision theory is not justified in the former case. 
Id. For example, Rubin argues: 
Bundling lacks the short-term consumer benefit of lower prices or higher bids 
and does not impart an unambiguous short-run benefit. Whether a particular in-
stance of bundling does or does not create consumer surplus in a particular case 
would depend on the circumstances. Not so with predatory pricing, in which 
every penny of lower prices during the “pre recoupment” phase inures to the 
benefit of consumers. As a result, a decision-theoretic, cost-based rule may be 
justified for predatory pricing, where the risk of a false positive arguably over-
whelms the costs of making a correct decision. Decision-theoretic liability rules, 
however, are not appropriate for bundling, or other exclusionary strategies. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 212 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 475 U.S. at 588-91, 593-95; Brooke Grp. 
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220-24 (1993); Cascade Health 
Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895, 911 (9th Cir. 2007), opinion amended and super-
seded, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993)). 
 213 The Cascade court “rejected . . . the notion that above-cost prices . . . [ever] inflict 
injury to competition under the antitrust laws.” Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 911, 
opinion amended and superseded, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Brooke Grp. Ltd. 
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never brought it to the court’s attention that the rule would operate in such a 
way in certain (i.e., high technology, New Economy, communications, etc.) 
markets because the case involved litigation between hospitals.214 Carrying the 
argument to its logical extreme, one commentator has argued that, “a cost-
based rule allows high technology firms to evade predatory pricing liability 
entirely, because the marginal cost of producing most intellectual property is 
zero.”215 In other words, the law’s bias for false negatives has left a wide loop-
hole for firms in certain industries to use strategic pricing in ways that existing 
rules, based on application of decision theory, are not equipped to address. 
This problem suggests that the law ought to start giving increased solicitude to 
concerns that low-pricing is being employed anticompetitively in industries 
categorized by the structural features described in the last sub-section.216 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This simple illustration of the prospective antitrust concerns raised by the 
quad play bundle reveals that the Ninth Circuit’s “discount attribution” test 
suffers from substantial weaknesses. These flaws come to the fore in the case 
of the quad play bundle. This discussion has shown that the Commercial 
Agreements between Verizon Wireless and the Cable Defendants would allow 
the quad play to be marketed in ways that would be anticompetitive yet still 
legal under a cost-based rule of per se legality for above-cost bundled dis-
                                                                                                             
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993)). The court mentions 
only the risks of false positives, stating that the Supreme Court has “cautioned [it] that ‘the 
costs of erroneous findings of predatory-pricing liability were quite high [if above-cost is 
used] because [t]he mechanism . . . is the same mechanism by which a firm stimulates com-
petition.” Id. at 913 (quoting Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 
Inc., 549 U.S. 312, 319 (2007)) (last alteration in original). 
 214 For example, a review of Plaintiff McKenzie–Willamette Hospital’s complaint, trial 
memorandum, and response to renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law reveals no 
mention that false negatives occur in bundled discount situations. See, e.g., Complaint of 
Plaintiff McKenzie–Willamette Hospital, 502 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 02-6032-TC); 
Plaintiff McKenzie-Willamette Hospital’s Trial Memorandum, 502 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(No. 02-6032-HA); Plaintiff McKenzie-Willamette Hospital’s Response to Renewed Mo-
tion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, 502 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 02-6032-HA). 
 215 Thomas Piraino, Jr. has distilled this insight in the context of pure predatory pricing 
through the following assertion: “[A] cost-based rule allows high technology firms to evade 
predatory pricing liability entirely, because the marginal cost of producing most intellectual 
property is zero.” Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technol-
ogy Competition, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 126 (2002) (citing Patrick Bolton et al., 
Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2285 (2000)). 
 216 Of course, there is the possibility that this could undermine a uniform approach to 
evaluating the legality of bundled discounts across the economy. It remains to be seen 
whether this concern can be adequately addressed by the modification or adaptation of exist-
ing approaches. 
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counts. The Ninth Circuit’s discount attribution test incorporates Brooke 
Group-based fears of not only chilling pro-competitive price-cutting due to 
false positives, but also concerns over limited judicial ability to evaluate bun-
dling practices. The result is that anticompetitive bundles are likely to escape 
scrutiny given certain market characteristics: very high fixed costs in bundling 
products and very low average variable costs on bundled products.  
In this Article, I have tried to make the case that the incidence of false nega-
tives under a discount attribution test for bundled discounts is likely to be 
much higher than the theory underlying the test assumes. To that end, I have 
used a real-world example to illustrate how a Type II error would be likely to 
occur, and have argued that industries prone to Type II errors are much more 
prevalent in our economy than Cascade (and Brooke Group) thought. These 
conclusions indicate that the value of an above-cost safe harbor for bundled 
discounts should be questioned, since the justification for this rule derives in 
large part from the notion that false negatives are so unlikely so as not to be 
worth antitrust law’s notice. At the very least, should be accepted with a ca-
veat. If the Supreme Court ultimately endorses the discount attribution test for 
evaluating bundled discounts, this would not mean that the Court sees all 
above-cost bundled discounts as pro-competitive or competitively-neutral. This 
much is clear from existing case law, which apparently acknowledges the theo-
retical possibility of competitive harm where there is no below-cost pricing. 
The adoption of the rule would likely represent a judgment that it is better that 
some anticompetitive bundling go undetected, than that pro-competitive bun-
dling be deterred in the first instance for fear of a wrongfully-awarded treble 
damages award; this would reflect an extension of the decision-theoretic ap-
proach that pervades modern antitrust law into the realm of bundled discount-
ing practices.  However, the approach leads to rules that may be much more 
underinclusive than their proponents imagine. There may be entire industries, 
notably the telecommunications and New Economy sectors, where anticom-
petitive bundling is almost entirely immune from liability even where bundled 
discounts are anti-competitively used. This Article has tried to identify reasons 
that the discount attribution test is far from accurate in many cases, and has 
explained the difficulties that follow where liability rules for bundled discounts 
rely upon a decision-theoretic approach which is not be justified in several 
large and important sectors of the economy. 
 
